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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
convert a class action to enjoin the collection of taxes into one to recover
taxes illegally collected, nor may he recover the tax by way of ancillary
relief in an action for injunction, since it is contrary to the policy of the
statutes to permit injunction and recovery at the same time. 6 Having
obtained a temporary injunction, plaintiff could not be coerced into pay-
ment of the tax while the order remained in effect. The payment of
the tax under such circumstances was a voluntary payment, or at least a
waiver of any objection to the validity of the tax.
The inference from this holding is that a taxpayer, if he voluntarily
pays a tax, must institute an action to recover the tax under section
2723.01, observing both the one year requirement for instituting the
action and the payment under protest provision of section 2723.03 to
avoid the bar or waiver of the act of voluntary payment.
MAURICE S. CULP
TORTS
With an agility hardly expected from such a usually static body, the
Ohio Supreme Court jumped aboard two progressive tort bandwagons this
last year. While many will regard the removal of the immunity insula-
tion from non-profit hospitals as the more significant action, time may
well prove that even deeper social ramifications will follow from the
court's almost casual recognition that the right of privacy does indeed
exist in Ohio.
Immunities
In a 5-2 decision non-profit hospitals and possibly many other so-
called charitable organizations lost their shield of immunity, imperfect as
it had become.' Recognizing the inconsistencies which had arisen in the
Ohio rulings on the general problem and evaluating the changing pattern
of events surrounding such institutions, the court swept aside technicafity
and precedent alike, in a rare moment of conscious recognition of its
policy-clarifying role in public affairs. But the consequences of this deci-
sion are not dear even for non-profit hospitals. The court carefully ad-
hered to the limits of the pleadings and more important to the doctrine
of respondeat superior. Conceivably, later decisions could favor hospital
immunity by finding that in particular situations a doctor or a nurse had
acted as an independent contractor and not as an employee of the hos-
'Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Scioto-Sandusky Conservancy Dist., 101 Ohuo. App. 61,
137 N.E.2d 891 (1956).
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pital.2 Yet the decision constitutes a vital step. Other "charitable" msti-
tutions will undoubtedly be affected. The extent of future changes will
be determined by the changing social context and legal ingenuity3
The Right of Privacy
The other landmark was a 4-3 decision.4 While several lower courts
in Ohio had already recognized the right of privacy and while Ohio has
been listed for some time now as a state recognizing that right, this de-
cision could not have been predicted with absolute certainty.5 After all,
an earlier group of Ohio judges had managed to block recognition of the
analogous tort of mental disturbance. Fortunately, the Supreme Court
was confronted with the almost classic privacy situation, a collection
agency's harassment of a debtor. The agency telephoned the debtor, her
employer and her landlord on numerous occasions and at various times
trying to force payment. plaintiff debtor did allege economic loss, but
her main contention seems to have been that she was caused "nervous-
ness, worry, humiliation, mental anguish and loss of sleep." At any rate,
the amorphous doctrine has been firmly established in Ohio and the door
finally opened to the broader recognition of psychological infringements
including perhaps the intentional infliction of mental disturbance.
Deceit
In Pumphrey v. Quillen7 the Supreme Court indicated a hope that its
decision and reasoning in that case would have the effect of settling the
law of Ohio on the question of scienter in an action for deceit. The case
is without a doubt highly significant, but unfortunately mightily confus-
ing to an equally hopeful reader. Plaintiff vendee relied on the state-
ments of defendant broker in the purchase of a house. The broker stated
that the walls of the house were constructed of tile with a Perma-Stone
exterior. While there was a thin Perma-Stone veneer, it surrounded a
'Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956) Im-
munity had not been absolute, as the court's discussion of Ohio precedent shows.
2 In line with the "New York" rule, see 2 HAILPiR AND J-M is, THE LAw OF TORTS
§ 29.17 (1956).
' For a full discussion of this case and its implications, see Note, 8 Wm. RBs. L. RBv.
194 (1957).
'Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
'For a discussion of the right of privacy in Ohio, see Note, 7 WEsr. REs. L. Rv.
452 (1956).
'Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948). For a discussion of
this problem, see Note, 6 WEST. Rss. L. REv. 384 (1955).
"165 Ohio St. 343, 135 N.E.2d 328 (1956).
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combination of earth, clay and straw. Quite dearly the 6-1 majority has
held that something less than the classic sctenter is required for such a
plaintiff to recover damages from such a defendant. It was at least enough
that the defendant did not actually know whether his statement was true
or false. But what is not so dear is whether the court has gone even
further and imposed a warranty liability on this kind of transaction.
Knowing commentators do indicate a trend in this direction across the
country.8 The dissenting justice is adamant that the defendant was in
good faith and believed what he said. If the split of opinion be not mere-
ly a dispute as to whether there was a jury question on the presence or
absence of good faith in the defendant, then this case is a signpost of
things to come, at least in land sale transactions. Since the court did not
fully inform its legal public, it will surely be asked for another opinion
on the subject.
Defamation
McCarthy v. The Cincmnatt Enqurer9 is a case interesting for its facts
as well as significant for its legal perspective. The plaintiff is apparently
a well-known news commentator in Cincinnati. In some of his broadcasts
he vehemently criticized the proposed fluoridation of local drinking water.
The defendant newspaper attacked the plaintiff and his views in a strong-
ly worded editorial, accusing him of misleading the public and of engag-
ing in a kind of "news reporting that victimizes its gullible listener." The
court of appeals ruled in essence that since plaintiff had only pleaded ex-
cerpts from the editorial and since he had not shown any specific mone-
tary losses, he had not established a case of libel per se. A reading of the
majority opinion may lead to the reasonable conclusion either that the
majority believed that plaintiff deserved his scolding or that the words
used were not defamatory. Unfortunately the majority chose to couch
its rationalization in terms of the technical distinction which is coming
to cause increasing confusion in Ohio. As always, where such confusion
exists, courts seldom get down to discussing the vital issues in understand-
able terms.10
8 PROSSER, ToRTs § 88 (2d ed. 1955); 1 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs
§ 7.7 (1956) The latter authors also indicate that most of the confusion over the
definition of sctenter comes in the land sale transactions. Id. at § 7A.
0 136 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio App. 1956)
'The requirement of libel per se comes from confusion of the two meanings of
defamation per se: (1) words defamatory on their face; or (2) words that are ac-
tionable without proof of damage - according to PROSSER, TORTS § 93 (2d ed.
1955).
A careful reading of the latest supreme court declaration on the subject seems to
indicate that libel per se refers simply to the first meaning indicated above. Wes-
tropp v. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E.2d 340 (1947)
[Une
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Income Taxes and Personal Injury Verdicts
Personal injury awards are excluded from gross income under the
Internal Revenue Act of 1954.11 Conceivably juries, quite familiar with
the taxability of quiz show awards, might mistakenly believe that they
should compensate plaintiffs sufficiently to cover not only the plaintiff's
damages but also his taxes on that award. However, the Supreme Court
has ruled that it would be improper to instruct the jury that it mast take
this exclusion into consideration in arriving at the amount of its verdict
m a personal injury action.12 Three judges in a concurring opinion sigm-
ficantly pointed out that "a proper charge in this subject could be drawn
and properly given if it went only to the extent of warming the jury not
to consider income tax liability on the award which it might make."
Municipal Liability for Nuisance
Mumcipal corporations are expressly subject to liability for failing to
keep, rnter alia, streets and sidewalks free from nuisance.13 In an admit-
tedly "strict" construction of the nuisance statute, the supreme court has
limited its application to situations involving the affirmative use of the
streets and sidewalks for purposes of travel' 4  The defendant city had
hired an independent contractor to widen one of the city streets. The
contractor cut off some of the roots of a tree, leaving it in a weakened
condition. During the subsequent winter the tree, located at the curb
line, began leaning away from the pavement toward a house which was
insured by plaintiff. After the city had been notified of the danger, but
before it could carry out the removal of the tree, the tree fell. Plaintiff
sued the city for its losses in paying for the damage to the house. Under
the court's interpretation, the city was liable neither under the statute nor
under the common law. Under the former the "weakened tree did not
constitute a disrepair, defect or nuisance in the 'street' itself. " Under
the latter, the city was acting in its governmental capacity.
Negligence
One who negligently contributes to the damage of another is not in-
sulated from liability by the negligent acts of an interveming human
agency so long as such acts are "foreseeable."'15 As a corollary, two or
" 26 U.S.C.A. § 104 (1954)
'Maus v. N.Y., Chli. St. L. Rd. Co., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E.2d 253 (1956).
'aOHIO REV. CODE § 723.01.
"Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Fremont, 164 Ohio St. 344, 131 N.E.2d 221(1955).
'12 HARPER AND JAMBS, TiH LAW OF TORTS 5 20.05 (1956).
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more persons may be concurrently negligent in contributing to another
person's damage. However, there are situations where courts conclude
that an intervening wrongdoer should be liable, but not the original
wrongdoer. A sociological analysis rather than the usual strictly legal,
"technical" explanation might justify such a conclusion, but courts are
human and like all humans are creatures of habit. Oftentimes in such
cases, the rationale expressed by the court is not compelling and may con-
flict with other equally acceptable legal principles. Such a case is Hurt v.
Charles J. Rogers Transp. Co.16 The plaintiff was injured by a
steel forging which crashed through the windshield of his automobile.
The defendant Ford Motor Co. had negligently packed boxes of forgings
which were being transported by a tractor-trailer outfit.17 The driver of
this outfit discovered forgings dropping from his outfit along the high-
way but took inadequate steps to remedy the situation. The Supreme
Court held that this was the familiar situation of the responsible interven-
ing agent who could or should have eliminated the hazard negligently
created by the original wrongdoer. The court did not mention the prm-
ciples cited at the beginning of this paragraph. Unless the court is taking
a view which is almost unbelievably lenient to original wrongdoers as a
class, the reader must figure out his own rationale in terms of the class
to which this particular defendant belongs. Thus, in Ohio, articles drop-
ping from highway vehicles become upon his discovery the risk of the
transporter rather than of the manufacturer-distributor.' 8
In Lehman v. Haynam1' 'the Supreme Court reasonably concluded that
an automobile driver who crosses to the left over the center line of a
highway and crashes into another automobile coming properly from the
opposite direction may claim as an excuse in the resulting negligence ac-
ton that he lost consciousness. The court just as reasonably concluded
that such an excuse is by way of defense, that is, the plaintiff need not
prove that defendant was conscious, rather defendant has the burden of
proving his own unconsciousness. Imagine the difficulty of his doing so.
If defendant claimed he had at some prior tune lost consciousness while
driving or that he was subject to fainting, then he would be proving his
own negligence in driving at all.
The other cases of interest were decided in the lower courts. In one
case, the driver of a dairy truck was held negligent for not slowing down
'- 164 Ohio St. 329, 130 N.E.2d 824 (1955)
'
7 The transportation agency was held liable in Hurt v. Charles J. Rogers Transp. Co.,
164 Ohio St. 323, 130 N.E.2d 820 (1955)
2' The court does talk, however, as if it were applying the long outmoded "last wrong-
doer" rule. See 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 20.06 (1956)
10164 Ohio St. 595, 133 N.E.2d 97 (1956).
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